靶机来源: 知攻善防实验室公众号 https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/gCWGnBiwbqSnafXU1apJCA
我是在另一台主机上通过ssh连接到靶机进行解题的,以下为解题记录。
背景
远景需要:小王急急忙地找到小张,小王说"李哥,我dev服务器被黑了",快救救我!!
挑战内容:
(1)黑客的IP地址
(2)遗留下的三个flag
解题
首先查察当前主机最近的用户登录情况,如何黑客乐成登录,那么可以查到乐成登录的记录。- [root@localhost defend]# grep "Accepted " /var/log/secure* | awk '{print $1,$2,$3,$9,$11}'
- Mar 18 20:23:07 root 192.168.75.129
- Mar 20 14:28:21 defend 192.168.1.104
复制代码 此处可以看到3月18日,root用户进行了登录,IP地址为192.168.75.129,该IP大概就是黑客的IP地址。
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IP正确,接着看看有没有黑客新增的用户。- [root@localhost defend]# cat /etc/passwd
- root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
- bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
- daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
- adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin
- lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin
- sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync
- shutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown
- halt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt
- mail:x:8:12:mail:/var/spool/mail:/sbin/nologin
- operator:x:11:0:operator:/root:/sbin/nologin
- games:x:12:100:games:/usr/games:/sbin/nologin
- ftp:x:14:50:FTP User:/var/ftp:/sbin/nologin
- nobody:x:99:99:Nobody:/:/sbin/nologin
- systemd-network:x:192:192:systemd Network Management:/:/sbin/nologin
- dbus:x:81:81:System message bus:/:/sbin/nologin
- polkitd:x:999:998:User for polkitd:/:/sbin/nologin
- libstoragemgmt:x:998:996:daemon account for libstoragemgmt:/var/run/lsm:/sbin/nologin
- colord:x:997:995:User for colord:/var/lib/colord:/sbin/nologin
- rpc:x:32:32:Rpcbind Daemon:/var/lib/rpcbind:/sbin/nologin
- saned:x:996:993:SANE scanner daemon user:/usr/share/sane:/sbin/nologin
- saslauth:x:995:76:Saslauthd user:/run/saslauthd:/sbin/nologin
- abrt:x:173:173::/etc/abrt:/sbin/nologin
- setroubleshoot:x:994:991::/var/lib/setroubleshoot:/sbin/nologin
- rtkit:x:172:172:RealtimeKit:/proc:/sbin/nologin
- pulse:x:171:171:PulseAudio System Daemon:/var/run/pulse:/sbin/nologin
- chrony:x:993:988::/var/lib/chrony:/sbin/nologin
- unbound:x:992:987:Unbound DNS resolver:/etc/unbound:/sbin/nologin
- radvd:x:75:75:radvd user:/:/sbin/nologin
- tss:x:59:59:Account used by the trousers package to sandbox the tcsd daemon:/dev/null:/sbin/nologin
- usbmuxd:x:113:113:usbmuxd user:/:/sbin/nologin
- geoclue:x:991:985:User for geoclue:/var/lib/geoclue:/sbin/nologin
- qemu:x:107:107:qemu user:/:/sbin/nologin
- gluster:x:990:984:GlusterFS daemons:/run/gluster:/sbin/nologin
- gdm:x:42:42::/var/lib/gdm:/sbin/nologin
- rpcuser:x:29:29:RPC Service User:/var/lib/nfs:/sbin/nologin
- nfsnobody:x:65534:65534:Anonymous NFS User:/var/lib/nfs:/sbin/nologin
- gnome-initial-setup:x:989:983::/run/gnome-initial-setup/:/sbin/nologin
- sshd:x:74:74:Privilege-separated SSH:/var/empty/sshd:/sbin/nologin
- avahi:x:70:70:Avahi mDNS/DNS-SD Stack:/var/run/avahi-daemon:/sbin/nologin
- postfix:x:89:89::/var/spool/postfix:/sbin/nologin
- ntp:x:38:38::/etc/ntp:/sbin/nologin
- tcpdump:x:72:72::/:/sbin/nologin
- defend:x:1000:1000:defend:/home/defend:/bin/bash
- redis:x:988:982:Redis Database Server:/var/lib/redis:/sbin/nologin
复制代码 这里好像没有看到可疑用户,接着看看有没有可疑的历程- [root@localhost defend]# ps -aux
- USER PID %CPU %MEM VSZ RSS TTY STAT START TIME COMMAND
- root 1 0.3 0.1 193824 7000 ? Ss 14:25 0:03 /usr/lib/systemd/systemd --switched-root --system --deserialize 22
- root 2 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 14:25 0:00 [kthreadd]
- root 4 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S< 14:25 0:00 [kworker/0:0H]
- root 6 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 14:25 0:00 [ksoftirqd/0]
- root 7 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 14:25 0:00 [migration/0]
- root 8 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 14:25 0:00 [rcu_bh]
- root 9 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 14:25 0:00 [rcu_sched]
- root 10 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S< 14:25 0:00 [lru-add-drain]
- root 11 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 14:25 0:00 [watchdog/0]
- root 12 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 14:25 0:00 [watchdog/1]
- root 13 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 14:25 0:00 [migration/1]
- root 14 0.3 0.0 0 0 ? S 14:25 0:03 [ksoftirqd/1]
- root 15 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 14:25 0:00 [kworker/1:0]
- root 16 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S< 14:25 0:00 [kworker/1:0H]
- root 17 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 14:25 0:00 [watchdog/2]
- root 18 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 14:25 0:00 [migration/2]
- root 19 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 14:25 0:00 [ksoftirqd/2]
- ......
- ......
- ......
- defend 3164 0.0 0.0 160988 2520 ? S 14:28 0:00 sshd: defend@pts/0
- defend 3174 0.0 0.0 116328 2848 pts/0 Ss 14:28 0:00 -bash
- root 3300 0.0 0.1 231952 3928 pts/0 S 14:28 0:00 su
- root 3319 0.0 0.0 116324 2880 pts/0 S 14:28 0:00 bash
- root 3717 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 14:30 0:00 [kworker/2:0]
- root 3830 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 14:31 0:00 [kworker/0:0]
- defend 3919 0.2 0.8 697416 31464 ? Sl 14:31 0:00 /usr/libexec/gnome-terminal-server
- defend 3925 0.0 0.0 8536 724 ? S 14:31 0:00 gnome-pty-helper
- defend 3926 0.0 0.0 116444 2932 pts/1 Ss 14:31 0:00 bash
- defend 4011 0.0 0.0 116444 1916 pts/1 S+ 14:31 0:00 bash
- root 4094 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 14:35 0:00 [kworker/2:2]
- root 4104 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 14:36 0:00 [kworker/0:1]
- root 4133 0.0 0.0 108052 352 ? S 14:38 0:00 sleep 60
- root 4134 0.0 0.0 157532 1900 pts/0 R+ 14:39 0:00 ps -aux
复制代码 也没有看到可疑的历程,那就看看黑客登录乐成之后都执行过什么命令- [root@localhost defend]# history
- 1 ls
- 2 chmod +x /etc/rc.d/rc.local
- 3 cat /etc/rc.d/rc.local
- 4 vim /etc/rc.d/rc.local
- 5 echo flag{thisismybaby}
- 6 exit
- 7 grep "Accepted " /var/log/secure* | awk '{print $1,$2,$3,$9,$11}'
- 8 cat /etc/passwd
- 9 netstat -anltup
- 10 ps -aux
- 11 history
复制代码 这里直接发现了第一个flag:flag{thisismybaby}
除此之外,还发现黑客编辑了开机启动文件rc.local,查察一下这个文件- [root@localhost defend]# cat /etc/rc.d/rc.local
- #!/bin/bash
- # THIS FILE IS ADDED FOR COMPATIBILITY PURPOSES
- #
- # It is highly advisable to create own systemd services or udev rules
- # to run scripts during boot instead of using this file.
- #
- # In contrast to previous versions due to parallel execution during boot
- # this script will NOT be run after all other services.
- #
- # Please note that you must run 'chmod +x /etc/rc.d/rc.local' to ensure
- # that this script will be executed during boot.
- # flag{kfcvme50}
- touch /var/lock/subsys/local
复制代码 在该文件中发现了第二个flag:flag{kfcvme50}
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按照黑客的攻击思绪,此时黑客已经拿到了root用户权限而且可以实现权限维持。那么第三个flag应该不会在筹划任务中,而是在黑客打进来的地方。
那么黑客是怎么打进来的?
此时,想到了刚才查察passwd文件时,最后一个用户是redis用户,阐明该机器上存在redis服务,于是查察网络连接,看看6379端口是否开放。- [root@localhost defend]# netstat -anltup
- Active Internet connections (servers and established)
- Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address Foreign Address State PID/Program name
- tcp 0 0 127.0.0.1:25 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 1291/master
- tcp 0 0 0.0.0.0:111 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 761/rpcbind
- tcp 0 0 192.168.122.1:53 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 1703/dnsmasq
- tcp 0 0 0.0.0.0:22 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 1089/sshd
- tcp 0 0 127.0.0.1:631 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 1092/cupsd
- tcp 0 0 192.168.1.105:22 192.168.1.104:59096 ESTABLISHED 3160/sshd: defend [
- tcp6 0 0 ::1:25 :::* LISTEN 1291/master
- tcp6 0 0 :::111 :::* LISTEN 761/rpcbind
- tcp6 0 0 :::22 :::* LISTEN 1089/sshd
- tcp6 0 0 ::1:631 :::* LISTEN 1092/cupsd
- udp 0 0 192.168.122.1:53 0.0.0.0:* 1703/dnsmasq
- udp 0 0 0.0.0.0:67 0.0.0.0:* 1703/dnsmasq
- udp 0 0 0.0.0.0:68 0.0.0.0:* 3052/dhclient
- udp 0 0 0.0.0.0:111 0.0.0.0:* 761/rpcbind
- udp 0 0 127.0.0.1:323 0.0.0.0:* 821/chronyd
- udp 0 0 0.0.0.0:914 0.0.0.0:* 761/rpcbind
- udp 0 0 0.0.0.0:56315 0.0.0.0:* 802/avahi-daemon: r
- udp 0 0 0.0.0.0:5353 0.0.0.0:* 802/avahi-daemon: r
- udp6 0 0 :::111 :::* 761/rpcbind
- udp6 0 0 ::1:323 :::* 821/chronyd
- udp6 0 0 :::914 :::* 761/rpcbind
复制代码 没有发现6379端口,那么先运行该服务。- [root@localhost defend]# redis-server
- 4368:C 20 Mar 14:55:04.305 # Warning: no config file specified, using the default config. In order to specify a config file use redis-server /path/to/redis.conf
- 4368:M 20 Mar 14:55:04.306 * Increased maximum number of open files to 10032 (it was originally set to 1024).
- _._
- _.-``__ ''-._
- _.-`` `. `_. ''-._ Redis 3.2.12 (00000000/0) 64 bit
- .-`` .-```. ```\/ _.,_ ''-._
- ( ' , .-` | `, ) Running in standalone mode
- |`-._`-...-` __...-.``-._|'` _.-'| Port: 6379
- | `-._ `._ / _.-' | PID: 4368
- `-._ `-._ `-./ _.-' _.-'
- |`-._`-._ `-.__.-' _.-'_.-'|
- | `-._`-._ _.-'_.-' | http://redis.io
- `-._ `-._`-.__.-'_.-' _.-'
- |`-._`-._ `-.__.-' _.-'_.-'|
- | `-._`-._ _.-'_.-' |
- `-._ `-._`-.__.-'_.-' _.-'
- `-._ `-.__.-' _.-'
- `-._ _.-'
- `-.__.-'
- 4368:M 20 Mar 14:55:04.309 # WARNING: The TCP backlog setting of 511 cannot be enforced because /proc/sys/net/core/somaxconn is set to the lower value of 128.
- 4368:M 20 Mar 14:55:04.309 # Server started, Redis version 3.2.12
- 4368:M 20 Mar 14:55:04.309 # WARNING overcommit_memory is set to 0! Background save may fail under low memory condition. To fix this issue add 'vm.overcommit_memory = 1' to /etc/sysctl.conf and then reboot or run the command 'sysctl vm.overcommit_memory=1' for this to take effect.
- 4368:M 20 Mar 14:55:04.309 # WARNING you have Transparent Huge Pages (THP) support enabled in your kernel. This will create latency and memory usage issues with Redis. To fix this issue run the command 'echo never > /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/enabled' as root, and add it to your /etc/rc.local in order to retain the setting after a reboot. Redis must be restarted after THP is disabled.
- 4368:M 20 Mar 14:55:04.310 * DB loaded from disk: 0.001 seconds
- 4368:M 20 Mar 14:55:04.310 * The server is now ready to accept connections on port 6379
复制代码 redis运行起来之后,需要进行登录,但是不知道密码,那就先尝试一下redis未授权。- [root@localhost defend]# redis-cli -h 127.0.0.1
- 127.0.0.1:6379>
复制代码 直接登录乐成,那么黑客应该是通过redis未授权打进来的,看看/root/.ssh下有没有被写入ssh密钥- [root@localhost .ssh]# pwd
- /root/.ssh
- [root@localhost .ssh]# ls -liah
- total 4.0K
- 51847075 drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 29 Mar 18 20:22 .
- 33582977 dr-xr-x---. 7 root root 265 Mar 18 20:25 ..
- 51847076 -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 661 Mar 18 20:22 authorized_keys
- [root@localhost .ssh]# cat authorized_keys
- REDIS0007� redis-ver3.2.12�
- redis-bits�@�ctime�2�eused-mem��h
- ��TJB=
- ssh-rsa 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 chinaran@kali
- �nh����[root@localhost .ssh]#
复制代码 到此,推测黑客是通过redis未授权写入ssh密钥进行登录,然后通过写入开机启动文件进行权限维持。
接着来寻找第三个flag。到此,由于我比较菜就没啥思绪了,于是就看看有哪些文件被修改过。- [root@localhost .ssh]# rpm -Vf /usr/bin/*
- file /usr/bin/alt-java is not owned by any package
- SM5....T. c /etc/rc.d/rc.local
- SM5....T. c /etc/rc.d/rc.local
- file /usr/bin/ControlPanel is not owned by any package
- SM5....T. c /etc/rc.d/rc.local
- SM5....T. c /etc/rc.d/rc.local
- file /usr/bin/itweb-settings is not owned by any package
- file /usr/bin/java is not owned by any package
- file /usr/bin/javaws is not owned by any package
- SM5....T. c /etc/rc.d/rc.local
- SM5....T. c /etc/rc.d/rc.local
- file /usr/bin/keytool is not owned by any package
- SM5....T. c /etc/rc.d/rc.local
- SM5....T. c /etc/rc.d/rc.local
- SM5....T. c /etc/rc.d/rc.local
- file /usr/bin/orbd is not owned by any package
- file /usr/bin/pack200 is not owned by any package
- file /usr/bin/policyeditor is not owned by any package
- file /usr/bin/policytool is not owned by any package
- missing /var/run/pulse
- file /usr/bin/readcd is not owned by any package
- S.5....T. c /etc/redis.conf
- S.5....T. c /etc/redis.conf
- S.5....T. c /etc/redis.conf
- S.5....T. c /etc/redis.conf
- S.5....T. c /etc/redis.conf
- S.5....T. c /etc/redis.conf
- file /usr/bin/rmid is not owned by any package
- file /usr/bin/rmiregistry is not owned by any package
- file /usr/bin/servertool is not owned by any package
- SM5....T. c /etc/rc.d/rc.local
复制代码 从上面看到redis的配置文件/etc/redis.conf被修改过,打开看看- [root@localhost defend]# cat /etc/redis.conf
- # flag{P@ssW0rd_redis}
- # Redis configuration file example.
- #
- # Note that in order to read the configuration file, Redis must be
- # started with the file path as first argument:
- #
- # ./redis-server /path/to/redis.conf
- # Note on units: when memory size is needed, it is possible to specify
- # it in the usual form of 1k 5GB 4M and so forth:
- #
- # 1k => 1000 bytes
- # 1kb => 1024 bytes
- # 1m => 1000000 bytes
- # 1mb => 1024*1024 bytes
- # 1g => 1000000000 bytes
- # 1gb => 1024*1024*1024 bytes
- #
- # units are case insensitive so 1GB 1Gb 1gB are all the same.
复制代码 直接在第一行看到了第三个flag:flag{P@ssW0rd_redis}
至此,就拿到了三个flag。
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